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DEDUCTIONS FOR REFUNDED CLAIM OF RIGHT INCOME:
SECTION 1341 AND DEPLETION ALLOWANCES
In 1952 the Skelly Oil Company was producing and selling natural gas
in Oklahoma, under contract, to the Cities Service Company and the Dor-
chester Corporation. In that year, the Oklahoma Corporation Commis-
sion established a minimum price for sales of natural gas, thus raising the
price stated in the previous contracts. However, in 1958 the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the minimum price order was invalid and it was
subsequently vacated.' During the years 1952 through 1957, Skelly had
included the amounts received under the minimum price order in its "gross
income from the property," 2 and thus received a 271/o depletion allow-
ance for that income.3
In 1958, Skelly was forced to repay the overcharge of $5,536.54 to the
Dorchester Corporation, and settled a lawsuit brought by the Cities Service
Company by paying them $500,000. On its 1958 Federal tax return,
Skelly took a business expense deduction for the full $505,536.54 which it
had returned to its customers. The Internal Revenue Service, however,
objected and reduced Skelly's 1958 depletion allowance by $139,022.55,
which represented 271 o of the amount deducted on the return. Skelly
paid the deficiency adjustment, filed a claim and ultimately filed a suit for
a refund. The District Court upheld the adjustment,' but the Court of Ap-
peals reversed.5 Upon petition by the government, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari,6 and reversed,7 holding that Section 1341 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code does not permit the taxpayer to deduct the total re-
funded amount without subtracting the amount taken previously as a de-
pletion.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
In order to fully understand the problems which arose in the noted
case, it is first necessary to briefly consider some of the general concepts of
tax law as set forth in several Supreme Court decisions. One of the most
basic concepts is that each year's tax must be definitely determined on the
I ichigan Wisconsin Pipeline Co. v. Corp. Comm'm. of Oklahoma, 355 U.S. 425 (1958).
2
"Gross income from the property," in the case of oil and gas wells, refers to the amount
for which the taxpayer sells the oil and gas in the immediate vicinity of the well. "Gross in-
come from the property" is a component of "gross income."
3A percentage depletion is allowed at a rate of 27 % of the "gross income from the prop-
erty" subject to the limitation that it may not exceed 50% of the "taxable income from the prop-
erty." INT. R.Ev. ConE of 1954, §§ 612, 613(a), 613(b).
4 Skelly Oil Co. v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Okla. 1966).
5 Skelly Oil Co. v. United States, 392 F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1967), a/f'd. on rehearing 392
F.2d 133 (1968).
6 Skelly Oil Co. v. United States, 393 U.S. 820 (1968).
7 Skelly Oil Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 678 (1969).
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basis of a calendar or fiscal year. This doctrine was adopted in 1931 by
the Supreme Court in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.8  Under this ap-
proach, taxable income is computed on the basis of the income and ex-
penses which represent all of the transactions during a twelve month pe-
riod, including transactions that have not been fully completed within that
period. This approach was chosen as preferrable to a transactional account-
ing system, whereby the income from each transaction is determined only
upon completion of the transaction and therefore not reported until the
year of completion. Thus the assessment of the tax might be postponed
"[u]ntil the end of a lifetime, or for some other indefinite period. . -
It was in Burnet that the Supreme Court decided that the annual approach
was more desirable because of its comparably uncomplicated application,
and because it provided a source of ascertainable revenue to the govern-
ment at regular intervals.
To compliment the annual accounting approach the Supreme Court an-
nounced one year later the well-known "Claim of Right" doctrine in the
case of North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet.10 This logical corol-
lary of the annual system was stated by Justice Brandeis as follows:
If a taxpayer received earnings under a claim of right and without restric-
tion as to its disposition, he has received income which he is required to
return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain
the money, and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its
equivalent."
Thus, if a taxpayer receives income in a taxable year, he is required to
report it as income for that year even though his claim of right to it is con-
tingent or in doubt, and even though it may develop later that he was not
entitled to it.' 2 This doctrine is justified on the grounds that the govern-
ment cannot await the final outcome of all possible contingencies before
collecting its revenue, and therefore the taxpayer must report his income as
it currently stands.
Although the issues in the North American Oil case were settled at
this point,'" the Court went on to explain the procedure to be followed if
the taxpayer was required to return the income in a later year:
8282 U.S. 359 (1931). The Court stated at 365:
"It is the essence of any system of taxation that it should produce revenue ascertainable,
and payable to the government, at regular intervals. Only by such a system is it prac-
ticable to produce a regular flow of income and apply methods of accounting, assess-
ment, and collection capable of practical operation."
Old. The Court went on to hold that a taxpayer could not postpone payment of a tax until it
was finally determined whether or not the uncompleted transaction would actually produce an
income gain.
10 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
11 Id. at 424.
122 M RTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcoMEn TAXATION § 12.103 (rev. ed. 1967).
13The income from oil land had been collected in 1916 by a court-appointed receiver. In
1917 the owner won the suit and the income was paid over to him. The suit was appealed how-
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If in 1922 the Government had prevailed, and the company had been
obliged to refund the profits received in 1917, it would have been entitled
to a deduction from the profits of 1922, not from those of any earlier year.' 4
This remedial procedure set out by Brandeis was in complete agree-
ment with the annual accounting system in that it required a deduction to
be taken during the current taxable year, i.e., the year of the return, rather
than giving the taxpayer a refund for the year of receipt. However, a de-
fect that was inherent in the rule forced some individual taxpayers to dis-
agree with its strict application in certain situations. The difficulty arose
in cases where the taxpayer found himself in a lower tax bracket or where
tax rates had been reduced since the year he reported the claim of right in-
come. In such a situation the taxpayer paid more taxes in the year of re-
ceipt than the benefit he received from the deduction in the year of return.
In view of the obvious harshness of such a result, some lower courts
chose to ignore the remedial dictum in North American Oil and treated
the income as being reported because of a "mistake of fact,"' 5 and conse-
quently the taxpayer was entitled to a refund for the year of receipt.' 8
The courts that allowed this type of remedy distinguished the North Amer-
ican Oil case on the ground that the taxpayer there had asked the govern-
ment to defer collecting the tax until the litigation had solved the issue,
whereas in these cases the tax had already been paid.
In effect, however, these decisions were merely a guise for utilizing the
old transactional approach, which the Supreme Court had specifically re-
jected in the Sanford & Brooks Co. case. By this time the proponents of
the transactional method had accepted the idea of reporting claim of right
income in the year of receipt, but they felt that once the contingencies were
finally settled, and the return of income was required, then the only equit-
able way to remedy the situation was to treat the entire occurrence within
one transaction. Under this approach, the taxpayer would then receive a
refund based on a recomputation of the taxes during the year of receipt,
rather than giving him a deduction for the year of return.
It was precisely this type of recomputation that the Supreme Court had
anticipated by its dictum in North American Oil, for they foresaw that it
would be attempted even though it would disrupt the accounting year.
Thus, when the Court of Claims utilized this transactional remedy in
United States v. Lewis 7 the Supreme Court emphatically reversed, 8 re-
ever, and finally affirmed in 1922. The issue in North American Oil then was whether the in-
come should have been reported in 1916, 1917, or 1922.
14 North American Oil Consolidated v. Buret, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932).
15Greenwald v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 569 (Ct. Cl. 1944); Gargaro v. United States,
73 F. Supp. 973 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
16 Some courts followed the rule strictly. See Haberkorn v. United States, 173 F.2d 587
(6th Cir. 1949).
1791 F. Supp. 1017 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
'8340 U.S. 590 (1951).
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peating the words of North American Oil and pointing out that "[n~oth-
ing in this language permits an exception merely because a taxpayer is
'mistaken' as to the validity of his claim."19  The Court then went on to
reaffirm its belief that the rule had to be strictly enforced:
Income taxes must be paid on income received (or accrued) during an
annual accounting period.... The "claim of right" interpretation of the
tax laws has long been used to give finality to that period, and is now
deeply rooted in the federal tax system.... We see no reason why the
Court should depart from this well-settled interpretation merely because it
results in an advantage or disadvantage to a taxpayer.20
The Court therefore felt that, although it would be harsh at times, the
rule was a necessary by-product of accounting year. It also should be
pointed out that the rule sometimes benefitted the taxpayer if, for example,
the tax rates had increased since the year of receipt. Furthermore, the
Court pointed out that the three-year statute of limitations would preclude
recovery in many cases if the transactional remedy was used.2'
Despite the dear intent of the Supreme Court, many lower courts con-
tinued to search for a more equitable remedy in these cases. In Healy v.
Commissioner,22 the Tax Court held that the income was received by the
taxpayer as a constructive trustee for the benefit of the creditors of the
corporation and thus was not income to the individual trustee for he ".
received nothing. . .for his separate use and benefit...."'3
The Supreme Court once again was forced to restate its opinion on such
attempts to undermine the accounting system:
24
Congress has enacted an annual accounting system under which income is
counted up at the end of each year. It would be disruptive of an orderly
collection of the revenue to rule that the accounting must be done over
again to reflect events occurring after the year for which the accounting
is made, and would violate the spirit of the annual accounting system. This
basic principle cannot be changed simply because it is of advantage to a
11 Id. at 591.
20 Id. at 592; Justice Douglas vigorously dissented:
"Many inequities are inherent in the income tax. We multiply them needlessly by
nice distinctions which have no place in the practical administration of the law. If
the refund were allowed, the integrity of the taxable year would not be violated. The
tax would be paid when due; but the government would not be permitted to maintain
the unconscionable position that it can keep the tax after it is shown that the payment
was made on money which was not income to the taxpayer."
21 d. at 592, n.1.
22 16 T.C. 200 (1951).
23 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 211 (1920).
24 Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953). At 282-83 the Court stated:
"A constructive trust is a fiction imposed as an equitable device for achieving jus-
tice. . ... Even though it has a retroactive existence in legal fiction, fiction cannot
change the "readily realizable economic value" and practical "use and benefit" which
these taxpayers enjoyed during a prior annual accounting period, antecedent to the
declaration of the constructive trust"
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taxpayer or to the government in a particular case that a different rule be
followed.25
II. THE ENACTMENT OF § 1341
It was in this atmosphere that Congress finally stepped in and provided
a workable and equitable remedy to the problem by enacting Section 1341
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.26 Congress had no intention of
tampering with the claim of right doctrine as such, but rather was dealing
solely with the remedial procedure to be followed after claim of right in-
come had to be returned by the taxpayer. In short, the sole purpose of
Section 1341 was to remedy the inequitable results reached in cases like
Healy and Lewis.17
Section 1341 requires that three conditions be met before it will apply.
First, it is necessary that the taxpayer show that he received an item of in-
come under a claim of right in a prior year and that he reported that item
in his gross income for that year. Secondly, he must show that he is now
entitled to a deduction because of a final determination that he did not
have an unrestricted right to that item. Lastly, the amount of the deduc-
tion must exceed $3000. Once these conditions are met, the tax for the
year of return will be the lesser of two computations. One computation
((a) (4)) is arrived at by using the method applied in Healy and Lewis,
i.e., the tax for the current year calculated with the deduction. The other
computation ((a) (5)) is arrived at by reducing the tax for the current
year (without the deduction) by an amount equal to the decrease in tax
for the prior year which results solely from the exclusion of the item from
the gross income. In other words, the taxpayer subtracts the excess amount
of tax he paid in the prior year from this year's tax.
Thus, if tax rates have been lowered since the year of receipt, an (a) (5)
2 5 1d. at 284-85.
26 Section 1341 (a) provides:
"if-
(1) an item was included in gross income for a prior taxable year (or years) because
it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to such item; (2) a deduction
is allowable for the taxable year because it was established after the dose of such
prior taxable year (or years) that the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to
such item or to a portion of such item; and (3) the amount of such deduction ex-
ceeds $3,000, then the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year shall be the
lesser of the following:
(4) the tax for the taxable year computed with such deduction; or
(5) an amount equal to-
(A) the tax for the taxable year computed without such deduction, minus
(B) the decrease in tax under this chapter (or the corresponding provisions of
prior revenue laws) for the prior taxable year (or years) which would result
solely from the exclusion of such item (or portion thereof) from gross income for
such prior taxable year (or years)." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1341 (a).
27 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 118; H. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
86 (1954).
In many instances of this nature the deduction allowable in the later year does not
compensate the taxpayer adequately for the tax paid in the earlier year.
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computation would be the lesser, and therefore, the applicable tax. On the
other hand, if tax rates have gone up, an (a) (4) computation would be
the tax for the current year. It is important to note that if the latter oc-
curs, the taxpayer receives a greater tax benefit for the current year than
the detriment he suffered in the prior year. Therefore, the intent of Con-
gress was to make sure that the taxpayer got at least an equal amount of
taxes back in the year of return, while also recognizing that he might get
back an even greater amount.
A closer analysis of Section 1341 reveals how Congress, in effect , com-
promised between the annual and transactional approaches. The (a) (4)
computation represents the strict annual approach since it merely codified
the old law as applied by the Supreme Court in Healy and Lewis.2" Con-
gress made sure that this approach would be used in the bulk of cases since
it is applicable also in situations where the tax brackets and rates have re-
mained unchanged, 29 and also in cases where the amount is less than
$3000.20 On the other hand, the (a)(5) computation represents a com-
bination of both the annual and transactional methods. It resembles the
latter in that it is a recomputation of the prior year's tax which is expressly
prohibited by the annual method. However, (a)(5) provides for a cur-
rent year adjustment rather than a refund for the prior year as the trans-
actionalist would demand. Thus, § 1341 introduces a new approach in
(a) (5) which might be called a modified transactional method, while at
the same time it retains the old annual method in (a) (4).
It was under Section 1341 (a) (4) that Skelly Oil took a deduction for
the amount of repayments on its 1958 tax return since its tax bracket and
tax rates remained unchanged." The obvious problem that arose was
whether Skelly could deduct the full amount of repayments without sub-
tracting the amount of depletion taken on that figure when it was reported
originally as income. At first glance the obvious answer is that Skelly
should have adjusted its 1958 deduction to accurately reflect the depletion
allowance given in the years of receipt. Otherwise, Skelly will receive a
tax benefit in the year of return that exceeds the tax detriment incurred
by the amount of the depletion allowance of 27 %2o. In other words, Skelly
will get back $1.275 for every $1.00 it paid in taxes. On the other hand,
"
8 Skelly Oil Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 678, 682 (1969).
"When the new approach was not advantageous to the taxpayer, the old law was to
apply under § 1341 (a)( 4)."
2Old.
3oS. REP. No. 1622, 83 Cong., 2d Sess. 118; H. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 87
(1954).
"Moreover, with amounts of $3,000 or under, the effect of excluding the repaid
amount from the earlier year's income is likely to have little, if any, tax advantage
over taking a deduction in the year of restitution."
31 Skelly Oil Co. v. United States, 392 F.2d 128, 131 (1968).
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in view of the complicated background which led up to the enactment of
§ 1341, a contrary answer is not altogether unfounded.
III. ARGUMENTS BASED ON SECTION 1341
Since the Supreme Court opinion neglects to state both sides of the ar-
gument fully and dearly, this note will attempt to do so. The argument
can be divided into two major categories; the statutory argument, and the
case-law argument. The statutory argument is based on an interpretation
of Section 1341 itself. This includes the controversy over the meaning of
the word "deduction" as used in that section. There is also disagreement
as to whether the deduction must be adjusted by referring to other sections
of the Code. Related to this problem is the double deduction argument.
Finally, there is a general discussion of what Congress actually intended
when it enacted Section 1341. The latter is a major argument, concerning
itself with general intent and is therefore quite different from the frequent
discussions of more specific intent in relation to the other statutory argu-
ments.
The pre-§ 1341 argument concerns itself with the application of the
general case-law concepts discussed earlier and, in addition, an analysis of
several cases which more specifically relate to the issues in the noted case,
i.e., the definition of the word "deduction," and the need for adjustments.
A. Definition of "eDeduction" Under Section 1341
The statutory argument centers mainly on the interpretation of the
words "item" and "deduction" found in (a) (1) and (a) (2) as follows:
If-
(1) an item was included in gross income for a prior taxable year (or
years) because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to
such item;
(2) a deduction is allowable for the taxable year because it was established
after the dose of such prior taxable year (or years) that the taxpayer did
not have an unrestricted right to such item or to a portion of such item;
The problem, in short, is to determine what exactly is meant by the "de-
duction" as used in (a) (2). Is it the equivalent of the "item" in (a) (1),
or is it an amount that might or might not be equal to that item, depending
on various adjustments necessitated by the Code as a whole? The Supreme
Court showed its agreement with the latter by stating that "[t]he section
does not imply in any way that the 'deduction' and the 'item' must neces-
sarily be equal in amount."32  The Court went on to emphasize the fact
that § 1341 was placed in subchapter Q (which deals with the side effects
of the annual accounting system) and therefore it was plain that a refer-
32 Skelly Oil Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 678, 683 (1969).
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ence to other sections of the Code was necessary to determine the amount
of the deduction.a3 The Treasury Regulations seem to substantiate this
view since it specifically refers to the deduction as arising under the pro-
visions of chapter 0'3
Thus, the Court in Skelly interpreted § 1341 as requiring that some
sort of deduction be allowed as a result of the refund in income, but it did
not necessarily equate that deduction with the amount of the item included
in the prior year's gross income.
As pointed out above, § 1341 sets up three conditions to be met before
it can be applied, i.e., if an item and if a deduction and if over $3,000
then.... It does not state that the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction in
the amount of the item. Section 1341 did not create a new deduction to be
measured by the amount of the returned item. As the legislative history
shows, its sole purpose was to relieve the inequities caused by taking the
already permissible deduction in a year where the tax rates were lower
than in the year of receipt.35
On the other hand, while the statute on its face does not specifically
equate the terms "item" and "deduction," a close analysis of the legislative
history shows that Congress, nevertheless may have intended to equate
them. The Congressional Committee Reports seem to be consonant with
the interpretation that the item and deduction are equal.
The Committee's bill provides that if the amount restored exceeds $3,000,
the taxpayer may recompute the tax for the prior year, excluding from in-
come the amount repaid. This is an alternative to taking the deduction
in the year of restitution [emphasis added.13
Note that the language used in § 1341 (a) (3) is as follows: "...the
amount of such deduction exceeds $3,000 [emphasis added.]" Yet the
Committee Report substitutes the words "amount restored," i.e., the item,
for the word "deduction." This seems to imply that Congress assumed
that the item and the deduction were one and the same. Furthermore, it
is clear from the Committee Reports that the words "item" and "amount"
33id.
34 Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1 (1957), which provides:
"If during the taxable year, the taxpayer is entitled under other provisions of chapter
1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to a deduction of more than $3,000 because
of the restoration to another of an item which was included in the taxpayer's gross
income for a prior taxable year (or years) under a claim of right, the tax imposed by
chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 for the taxable year shall be the tax
provided in paragraph (b) of this section."
35S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 118. H. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
86 (1954).
'Under present law if a taxpayer is obliged to repay amounts which he had received
in a prior year and included in income because it appeared that he had an unrestricted
right to such amounts, he may take a deduction in the year of restitution. In many in-
stances of this nature, the deduction allowable in the later year does not compensate
the taxpayer adequately for the tax paid in the earlier year."
3Od.
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were used interchangeably by Congress.17  This provides further evidence
that the amount of the deduction and the item included in gross income
were thought of as being equal.
B. The Need for Adjustments Under § 1341
While it is true that § 1341 does not, on the surface, specifically equate
"item" and "deduction," it is also true that it does not specifically require
the deduction to be adjusted by referring to other sections of the Code.
However the Committee Reports do show an apparent intent to adjust an
(a) (5) computation in some situations.38 The same is true for the Treas-
ury Regulations, which in addition specifically mention adjustments for
depletion allowances.3 9  However, it is significant that both of these
sources refer only to an (a)(5) computation, and that nowhere in the
Committee Reports or the Treasury Regulations is there any mention of
any type of adjustment to be made in an (a) (4) computation.
The question then arises as to why Congress would require an (a) (5)
computation to be adjusted, and at the same time, conspicuously neglect to
require adjustments for an (a) (4) computation. On the one hand, it can
be argued that the adjustments in the Treasury Regulations on (a) (5)
should be viewed as encompassing the entire section as a whole including
(a) (4). However, it has been suggested that the Treasury Regulations
are invalid on the subject of depletion adjustments." Both the Committee
Reports and the Treasury Regulations speak about income dependent upon
adjusted gross income and taxable income. Depletion allowances, how-
ever, are not a function of adjusted gross income, but rather are based upon
"gross income from the property."4' Thus, the validity of the Regulation
on the subject of depletion adjustments is highly questionable, especially
in view of the fact that § 1341 (a) (5) (B) states very clearly that the tax
37 See note 33.
38 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 118, 452 (1954):
"In computing the tax reduction for the prior taxable year attributable to the removal
of the item in question, if the earlier year would otherwise be dosed, no other items
may be adjusted. However, to the extent that adjusted gross income or taxable in-
come may be changed, items such as the medical and charitable deductions which are
dependent upon income may also be affected."
39Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1 (d)(4) (ii) (1954), which provides:
"No item other than the exclusion of the income proviously included under a claim of
right shall be considered in computing the amount of decrease in tax if reconsidera-
tion of such other item is prevented by the operation of any provision of the internal
revenue laws or any other rule of law. However, if the amounts of other items in
the return are dependent upon the amount of adjusted gross income, taxable income,
or net income (such as charitable contributions, foreign tax credit, deductions for de-
pletion, and net operating loss), appropriate adjustment shall be made as part of the
computation of the decrease in tax."
40 See generaldy, Casey and Craig, Restoration of Claim of Right Income and Percentage
Depletion, 68 DICK. L. REV. 381 (1963).
41 See note 3 supra.
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for the prior year is computed ". . .solely from the exclusion of such item
from gross income .... ." [emphasis added]. The use of the unequivocable
word "solely" seems to preclude a reference to either the legislative history
or the Treasury Regulations on the possibility of adjustments.
Even if it is assumed, however, that the Treasury Regulation is valid on
this point, and that the word "solely" does not preclude a reference to it,
the theory that it was intended to encompass the entire section as a whole
cannot be supported. The Committee Reports do not show this intent.
The adjustments are limited exclusively to situations where "[t]he tax re-
duction for the prior taxable year .... .42 is being computed ((a) (5)
computation).
It should be recalled at this point that (a) (4) is the applicable alterna-
tive in the noted case and that it represents merely the codification of the
case law prior to the enactment of § 1341. Viewed in that light, the ab-
sence of adjustments under (a) (4) is not surprising. If any adjustments
are to be made under (a) (4) the justification for them must be found
in the pre-§1341 case law. The Supreme Court in the Lewis and Healy
cases absolutely prohibited any adjustments, and it was for this reason
that (a) (5) had to be formulated. Thus, Congress had good reason
to allow various adjustments under an (a) (5) computation and to pre-
clude them under (a) (4). It should be recalled again that (a) (5) uti-
lizes a modified transactional approach in that it does refer back to the
prior year's tax, and it therefore logically follows that it should permit ad-
justments of that tax via the Treasury Regulations. An (a) (4) computa-
tion, however, because of its origin, is required to utilize the strict annual
approach, and under that method the prior year's tax cannot be recom-
puted or adjusted in any way.
The use of the words "gross income" in (a) (1) also seems to further
substantiate the argument that the adjustment for depletion allowances be
prohibited. Gross income has been defined in the Treasury Regulations
as follows:
[T~he total sales, less the cost of goods sold, plus any income from invest-
ments and from incidental or outside operations or sources. Gross income
is determined without subtraction of depletion allowances based on a per-
centage of income . .. [emphasis added.] 48
Section 1341 requires that the item be included in gross income, and
the amounts refunded by Skelly in the noted case, both the taxable amount
and the depletion allowance, were included in the previous year's gross
income. Any type of adjustment concerning a depletion allowance would
seem to be expressly prohibited by the use of this terminology. Section
42 See note 38 supra.
4 3Treas. Reg. § 1.6 1-3(a) (1957).
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1341 (a) (1) requires only that the item be included in gross income. It
does not say taxable income, nor does it mention any adjustments.
C. The Possibility of a Double Deduction Under § 1341
The Supreme Court, however, held that the failure to compute such ad-
justments would allow Skelly " '[t~he practical equivalent of a double de-
duction'... .44 which is impermissible without a clear declaration of intent
by Congress. 5 The purpose of § 1341 was to correct the inequities created
by Healy and Lewis, not to create a windfall in the form of a double de-
duction. Skelly took a 27 % depletion deduction in the years of receipt
and has now taken a 100o deduction on the amount returned, including
the amount of the depletion allowance. The Supreme Court held that
since the deduction mentioned in § 1341 (a) (2) did not necessarily mean
the same amount of the item included in gross income, a reference to the
Code as a whole was necessary. Thus, a referral to § 1016 (a) (2), which
deals with "Adjustments to Basis," reveals that: -(a) proper adjustment in
respect of the property shall in all cases be made . . .(a) . . . for exhaus-
tion, wear and tear, obsolescence, amortization and depletion . .. [empha-
sis added.1" And in the Treasury Regulations under § 1.1016-6(a) we
find that "[a]djustments must always be made to eliminate double deduc-
tions or their equivalent." In fact § 1341 itself contains an express provi-
sion against taking double deductions as stated in § 1341 (b) (3):
If the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year is the amount deter-
mined under subsection (a) (5), then the deduction referred to in subsec-
tion (a) (2) shall not be taken into account for any purpose of this subtitle
other than this section.
Again however, the above statement contained in (b) (3) only applies
to an (a) (5) computation, and this is an (a) (4) situation. The con-
spicuous absence of such a statement pertaining to (a) (4) is significant in
that it further illustrates the vast differences between the two alternatives.
It is not altogether inconceivable that Congress might well have intended
even to allow double deductions under (a) (4) in order to perserve the
sanctity of the accounting system, especially in view of their apparent in-
tent to equate the words "item" and "deduction."
In spite of this possibility however, the question in the noted case does
not center around whether a double deduction should be permitted in
these circumstances, but rather whether there actually was a double de-
duction involved. Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion points out that
44 Skelly Oil Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 678, 684 (1969).
45 Ilfeld v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62, 68 (1934):
"If allowed, this would be the practical equivalent of a double deduction. In the ab-
sence of a provision of the Act definitely requiring it, a purpose so opposed to pre-
cedent and equality of treatment of taxpayers will not be attributed to lawmakers."
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in all cases involving true double deductions, the taxpayer tried to deduct
twice for the same item. He states further:
In this case, by contrast, the respondent has taken two different deductions
accorded by Congress for distinct purposes. In the years 1952 through
1957 it deducted the proper amounts for depletion-a deduction which is
allowed by Congress "on the theory that the extraction of minerals gradu-
ally exhausts the capital investment in the mineral deposit," and which is
"designed to permit a recoupment of the owner's capital investment in the
minerals so that when the minerals are exhausted, the owner's capital is
unimpaired ...... The respondent's 1958 deduction was granted by Con-
gress for the entirely different reason that the refund of previously re-
ported income constituted a loss, or business expense. In purpose and
effect the deductions are wholly unrelated, and each is sustainable on its
own merits. Certainly it cannot be said either that the respondent did not
in fact exhaust the capital assets for which the deductions were allowed in
1952 through 1957 or that it did not suffer a business loss by the 1958
repayment.4 6
D. Congressional Intent
One of the major focal points in the case centers around the real intent
of Congress in enacting § 1341, and the related question of what it did not
intend. The majority was of the opinion that Congress could not have
intended the absurd result argued by Skelly. The Court points out that
under the old law which (a) (4) codifies, either the Government or the
taxpayer might be the beneficiary, depending upon the circumstances.
Thus, if tax rates had declined since the year of receipt, then the Govern-
ment benefited under the old law, but if they had increased, the taxpayer
benefited. But as the Court states towards the end of the opinion,
"[h]ere, the taxpayer always wins and the Government always loses. We
cannot believe that Congress would have intended such an inequitable re-
sult."'47  Furthermore, the purpose of a tax is to collect revenue, and the
effect of giving the taxpayer back $1.275 for every $1.00 paid certainly
does not achieve that goal. The motivating force behind § 1341 was a de-
sire to compensate the taxpayer, not to provide him with an unexpected
windfall.
One might ask, however, why the Court did not make such statements
in Lewis and Healy concerning the "inequitable result" achieved. What
consolation was it to the individual taxpayers in those cases when they
were told that the Government might lose in another set of circumstances.
In fact, Congress was fully aware of this false consolation when it enacted
§ 1341, and it was, in essence, the reason for enacting it. The Supreme
Court incorrectly assumes that since Skelly chose to utilize the (a) (4) com-
46 Skelly Oil Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 678, 695-96 (1969).
47 Id. at 686.
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putation, § 1341 can be completely ignored since (a) (4) represents merely
the codification of the old case law. After making this assumption, the
Court concludes that since, under the old law, there were cases in which
the Government benefitted, (a) (4) cannot stand for the proposition that
the taxpayer always wins. This obviously carries the case law codification
a bit too far, and in effect, cancels out the very reason for enacting § 1341.
Congress provided, and in fact required, that the taxpayer utilize the com-
putation that produced the lesser tax. With that in mind, it is readily ap-
parent that (a) (4) would never be used in a situation where the Govern-
ment would benefit because the alternate computation under (a) (5)
would always compensate the taxpayer fully and, therefore, be the lesser
tax. The only time (a) (4) would be used by the taxpayer would be in a
situation where his tax rate or bracket has not changed, or where the tax
rate has increased since the year of receipt. As was pointed out above,
the latter situation allows the taxpayer to receive a deduction benefit in an
amount which exceeds the tax detriment in the year of receipt. The con-
clusion obviously then is that Congress did indeed intend, and in fact re-
quired, that the taxpayer always win and the Government always lose un-
der § 1341.
IV. ARGUMENTS BASED ON PRE-§ 1341 CASE LAW
Up to this point major emphasis has been placed on the interpretation
of the statute itself, thus illustrating the various ambiguities and questions
presented by its terminology. However, there is one basic point upon
which the Supreme Count, the Government, and Skelly Oil Co. all con-
cur-namely, that § 1341 (a)(4) codified the old case law as expressed
in Healy and Lewis. It therefore seems logical that the search for the def-
inition of the term "deduction," and the possibility of required adjustments,
be conducted primarily in the area of the old case law. Once all parties
agree that (a) (4) codified pre-§ 1341 law, it seems rather fruitless to
argue about what the word "deduction" means in the statute when the
answer can easily be found by discovering how the courts defined it be-
fore § 1341 was enacted. The Court should have by-passed the ambigui-
ties of the statute and looked more closely at the specifics of the case law.
A. Definition of Deduction Under Old Case Law
First, it should be recalled that the deduction itself was first mentioned
in the case of North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, which de-
manded that the deduction be taken in the year of return in order to pre-
serve the accounting year. Although the Court in that case did not define
what the deduction would be, it was determined by all the courts following
that decision that it would be the amount of the item included in gross in-
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come during the year of receipt.48  Thus, in the Healy case the Supreme
Court states:
The Government conceeds that each of these taxpayers is entitled to a de-
duction for a loss in the year of repayment of the amount earlier included
in income [emphasis added.] 49
Furthermore, the Committee Reports show that Congress expressly in-
tended to codify the Lewis case as representative of the old law to be used
in (a) (4).50 It would be logical to assume that Congress therefore in-
tended that the definition of the word "deduction" be found in that
case. Lewis dearly states"' that the amount of the deduction is the equiv-
alent of the amount of the item included in the previous year's gross in-
come.
52
The case law therefore seems to substantiate Skelly's argument in the
noted case. However, there is one instance in the old cases that closely re-
sembles the situation in Skelly. The case of O'Meara v. Commissioner5
held in 1947 that the taxpayer had to adjust his deduction to reflect a pre-
viously taken depletion allowance. It should be noted however, that this
was a Tax Court case and it was never reviewed by a higher court. The
situation is also distinguishable on its facts in that the taxpayer never held
title to the oil producing land and, therefore, was never entitled to a de-
pletion allowance in the first place.
482 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCoME TAxATION § 12.106a at 431 (rev. ed. 1967).
"However, under prior law the taxpayer was entitled only to a deduction in the later
year of the amount repaid or restored in that year. (Citing Fleet Carrier Corp. v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C. 527 (1961); Estate of Samuel Stein 37 T.C. 945 (1962), sub-
sequent proceedings 40 T.C. 275 (1963).)"
49 345 U.S. at 284.
50 H. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A294, A295. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 451 (1954).
"If the taxpayer included an item in gross income in one taxable year, and in a subse-
quent taxable year he becomes entitled to a deduction because the item or a portion
thereof is no longer subject to his unrestricted use, and the amount of the deduction
is in excess of $3,000, the tax for the subsequent year is reduced by either the tax at-
tributable to the deduction or the decrease in the tax for the prior year attributable
to the removal of the item, whichever is greater. Under the rule of the Lewis case
(340 U.S. 590 (1951)), the taxpayer is entitled a deduction only in the year of repay-
ment."
51 340 U.S. at 591.
"[TJhe Government's position is that respondents 1944 tax should not be recom-
puted, but that respondent should have deducted the $11,000 as a loss in his 1946
tax return."
ONote that both Healy and Lewis refer to G.C.M. 16730, XV-1 CuM. BULL. 179, 181
(1936). That Bulletin states:
"On authority of the cases dted herein, this office is of the opinion that the profits in
question should not be eliminated from the taxpayer's gross income for the years 1928
and 1929, but that the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction, for the year in which paid,
of the amount of the profits paid.
53 8 T.C. 622 (1947).
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B. The Need for Adjustments Under the Old Case Law
There is also a pre-§ 1341 case suggesting that a reference to the prior
year's tax is permissible in certain circumstances. In the case of Arrow-
smith v. Commissioner,5M the Supreme Court ruled that an examination of
the prior year's tax returns was necessary to determine whether the cur-
rent year repayment gave the taxpayer a right to an ordinary or capital
loss. The taxpayer in that case had attempted to take a full 100o regular
loss on refunded income that had been received as a capital gain and had
therefore been taxed at a lower rate. The Court in Skelly felt that the
same situation presented itself here and concluded that "[i]f money was
taxed at a special lower rate when received, the taxpayer would be accorded
an unfair tax windfall if repayments were generally deductible from re-
ceipts taxable at the higher rate applicable to ordinary income." 5  Thus,
Arrowsmith stands for the proposition that the circumstances surrounding
the receipt of claim of right income cannot be ignored and must be taken
into account when the taxpayer claims a deduction in the year of repay-
ment. In short the Court states that "Ithe annual accounting concept
does not require us to close our eyes to what happened in prior years.'"'"
Again one wonders why this statement did not find its way into the opin-
ions of the Healy and Lewis cases.
V. CONCLUSION
Having explored all of the arguments put forth by the Government,
Skelly Oil and the Court, it becomes necessary to make a more detailed
analysis of the Court's opinion to discover exactly which argument they
actually relied on in reaching their decision. First, it seems safe to assume
that the holding was not based on the theory that the spirit of (a) (5) was
intended to embrace § 1341 as a whole (including the Treasury Regula-
tions). Despite the fact that Skelly gives us a modified transactional re-
sult, the Court expressly retained the Healy case, 7 and to say that (a) (5)
encompasses (a) (4) would, in effect, overrule Healy since (a) (4) and
(a) (5) are entirely opposite approaches.
Nor is the holding based on an interpretation of § 1341 as saying that
the deduction must be computed with reference to the Code as a whole.
54 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
55 Skelly Oil Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 678, 685 (1969).
56Id. at 684.
57 Id.
"In cases arising under the claim of right doctrine, this emphasis on the annual ac-
counting period normally requires that the tax consequences of a receipt should not
determine the size of the deduction allowable in the year of repayment. There is no
requirement that the deduction save the taxpayer the exact amount of taxes he paid




The Court was aware of the fact that the definition of the word "deduc-
tion" had to be found in the pre-§ 1341 case law since (a) (4) merely
codified it. Justice Marshall recognized this when he stated:
When the new approach was not advantageous to the taxpayer, the old law
was to apply under § 1341 (a) (4).
. ..Accordingly, as the courts below recognized, respondent's taxes
must be computed under § 1341 (a) (4) and thus, in effect, without re-
gard to the special relief Congress provided through the enactment of §
1341 [emphasis added].58
Furthermore, the result in Skelly does not seem to be based on O'Meara
v. Commissioner. While it is true that O'Meara must be considered as
part of the common law definition of the word "deduction," it is also
true that this case carries very little weight since it had never been re-
viewed by a higher court. Obviously, the validity of the decision is not af-
fected by the absence of appellate review, but its influence on the Supreme
Court is significantly reduced. This is especially true when the decision
seems to be a mere statement of a new principle without any reasoning to
support it. The majority in Skelly appears to have been cognizant of this
fact and, consequently, only refers to the case in passing. It is submitted
that the Court in Skelly was merely attempting to justify the O'Meara
case-they were not relying upon it.
The majority opinion attempts to justify its position that the situation
in Skelly gives rise to an Arrowsmith type exception to the Lewis case.
The Court emphasizes that tax rates and brackets are still ignored just as
they were in Arrowsmith,9 and, consequently, neither case is in direct
conflict with Lewis. Furthermore, the Court gives the circumstances here
an appearance of exceptionalism by pointing out that "[t3he approach
here will affect only a few cases."' ' The Court also claims that "[h]ere
as in Arrowsmith the earlier returns are not being reopened.", 61 but rather
a current year deduction is being computed in light of the circumstances
surrounding the receipt of the claim of right income. It is submitted that
while this argument may be valid in Arrowsmith, it has no application
in the noted case. In Skelly, the Court has allowed a recomputation,
based on the prior year's tax record, to discover how much excess depletion
allowances were given in the prior year. In Arrowsmith, on the other
hand, there was no recomputation involved, but merely a glance at the
prior year's tax record to see what kind (not how much) of a loss (ordi-
nary or capital) was involved. In other words, Arrowsmith permits a recog-
58 394 U.S. at 682.
59M. at 685.
"No attempt is being made to require the tax savings from the deduction to equal the
tax consequences of the receipts of prior years."
601d. at 686.
61 Id. at 685.
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nition, but not a recomputation. As was emphasized above, any type of re-
computation is contrary to Healy and Lewis, even though the adjustment is
reflected in the current year. If Arrowsmith allows a recomputation in the
current year because of the depletion allowance in the prior year, what would
preclude Arrowsmith from allowing a current year recomputation because
of higher tax rates in the prior year? More precisely, if Arrowsmith stands
for the proposition that the circumstances surrounding the receipt of claim
of right income must be taken into account in the form of an adjustment
when the taxpayer claims a deduction in the year of repayment, how can
it be argued that the tax rate is not just as much a "circumstance" as a
depletion allowance. It should be dear, therefore, that such an interpre-
tation of Arrowsmith would overrule Healy and Lewis, since it would
permit the very type of recomputation prohibited in those cases. Further-
more, such an interpretation would eliminate the need for (a) (5). Ob-
viously Congress did not read Arrowsmith that way and neither has the
Supreme Court in Skelly since, as was pointed out above, the opinion spe-
cifically retains the Healy case.
Finally, it is submitted that the decision in Skelly seems to be based on
the double deduction theory, despite the arguments put forth by Justice
Stewart in his dissent, supra. It is in this respect that Arrowsmith is im-
portant to the majority, in that it allows the Court to look back at the cir-
cumstances surrounding the receipt of the income and to recognize that it
gives rise to a double deduction in the year of repayment. However, if the
case is based on this theory it may create significant problems in the future
in that it may require individual taxpayers who took a full medical or
charitable deduction in the year of receipt, to take those deductions into
account when they seek a deduction under (a) (4) in the year of repay-
ment. 2 Justice Stewart recognizes that "[o]therwise there will be precisely
the same kind of so-called 'double deduction' as the Court finds in this
case."63 It is also important to note that these minor adjustments will not
be limited to cases involving more than $3,000 since the case is based on
(a) (4), i.e., the old law, which has no minimum requirement.64  Even
(a) (5) reflects Congress' recognition of the need to limit adjustments and
recomputations to larger amounts so as not to put an overwhelming burden
on the annual accounting concept. However, even if these adjustments
were to be limited to larger amounts they would still be in direct contra-
diction to Healy and Lewis by allowing a recomputation based on the prior
year's tax record. The Court in Skelly has also set the amount of the item
to be deducted at taxable income, while the case law clearly shows that
the item need only be included in gross income.
6 2 See generally, Stewart's dissent, pp. 692-699.
63 Id. at 697.
64 See note 30 supra.
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In conclusion, it is submitted that the result in the noted case, despite
the apparent superiority of Skelly's argument, was a desirable and equi-
table one in these circumstances. The Court showed its awareness of the
difficulty of justifying the decision in the light of Healy and Lewis by ef-
fectively avoiding the problem. This is shown by the Court's presentation
of the statutory argument which, in the final analysis, is actually irrele-
vant. This awareness is also illustrated by the Court's ultimate reliance
on the double deduction argument which has no relevance to the Healy
and Lewis problem. The Court could have more palatably, though incor-
rectly, relied on Arrowsmith by first reaffirming the validity of Healy and
Lewis, and then holding that the circumstances in Skelly gave rise to an
Arrowsmith-type exception. In this manner, the Court would be saying that
Arrowsmith did not overrule Healy and Lewis and that, therefore, the tax
rates would still be a circumstance to be ignored, while a depletion allowance
would be a circumstance which had to be recognized as an exception. This,
of course, would merely be an arbitrary extension of Ariowsmith, (by trans-
forming a recognition into a recomputation) followed by an illogical limita-
tion on that extension by stating that a recomputation is permissible for a
depletion allowance, but not for tax rates. Furthermore, is is obviously con-
tradictory to say that Healy and Lewis are still valid, but a recomputation is
permissible. But no matter how arbitrary, illogical or contradictory that
theory might be, it still would have been best to rely on it since it achieves
the desired result by the creation of an arbitrary, but equitable exception.
This exception would thus appear to be directly justified by Arrowsmith, but
in fact, would only be indirectly justified by it, i.e., Anrowsmith stands for
the proposition that some exceptions are allowed. Skelly would then be,
not an extension of Arrowsmith, but rather another exception in addi-
tion to Arrowsmith.
The Court seems to have stated this theory in the opinion, but effec-
tively abandoned it by continuing on (because of its flaws, and out of a
desire to justify this exception on other grounds) to put major reliance on
the double deduction argument. In view of the possible complications
which may arise out of that reliance, it is suggested that the Court should
have ignored the insufficiency of the Arrowsmith argument, and omitted
its discussion about double deductions. In that manner, the Court would
have been indirectly saying that Skelly was a necessary and desirable ex-
ception to Healy and Lewis, thus eliminating the problem at hand without
creating the new problem which it will undoubtedly have to face in the
future.
James 1. Erb
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